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1. INTRODUCTION
The Financial Accounting Standards Board’s (FASB) SFAS No. 142 
“Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets” replaces the amortization of 
goodwill with an annual test for impairment (see Appendix).  The FASB now
contends that goodwill is not a wasting asset, and therefore periodically 
testing for impairment is more representationally faithful than amortization 
over an arbitrary useful life.  The FASB also notes that intangible assets are 
increasing in proportion and importance for many entities, and many 
financial statement users do not incorporate goodwill amortization into their 
analysis.  In addition to changing the accounting for goodwill, the new 
pronouncement also requires entities to disclose information about the 
changes in the carrying value of goodwill both in the aggregate and by 
reportable segment.  The FASB expects the new accounting and disclosure 
rules to improve the usefulness of the overall financial reporting of goodwill 
and intangibles.  
The implementation of SFAS No. 142 provides a unique setting for 
examining the information content of the amortization and impairment of 
goodwill.  It also allows an examination of the market effects of voluntary 
disclosure choices.  Figure 1 shows a timeline of events associated with 
adopting SFAS No. 142.  These events provide the disclosure data for my 
tests.  The new standard provides a much larger sample of goodwill 
impairments in a relatively short time frame than prior accounting standards.  
Also, the initial goodwill impairments under SFAS No. 142 are freer from 
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other one-time charges, such as restructuring charges, which better isolates 
the effects of the goodwill impairments.  Finally, SFAS No. 142 provides a 
setting where it should be less likely that the impairments are anticipated 
more than a few months in advance, unlike goodwill impairments before 
SFAS No. 142 where negative returns in prior years appear to lead to the 
impairment charge.  
Until SFAS No. 142, GAAP required the costs of most non-current 
assets to be systematically and rationally allocated to the periods in which 
those assets enhance the company’s revenues.  Prior capital markets research 
shows that this allocation of costs appears to be valuable in regard to tangible 
assets, but the market appears to ignore the amortization of intangibles when 
setting stock prices.  If so, then the press release announcing an expected 
increase in earnings due to the change from amortization to impairment 
testing basically adds back an ignored expense.  If prior results are robust and 
the market is reasonably sophisticated, then there should be no market 
reaction to this event.  Many firms such as AOL-Time Warner disclose 
substantial expected earnings increases once amortization of goodwill ceases 
(see Figure 2).  
In addition to ceasing amortization, many firms record an initial 
impairment.  Will the impairment be ignored like the past amortization 
expenses?  Research generally suggests that impairments have information 
content; however, no prior study focuses solely on goodwill impairments.  
The implementation of SFAS No. 142 provides a large number of 
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observations of goodwill impairments that provide a basis for my tests.  For 
example, AOL-Time Warner recognized a $54 billion impairment of 
goodwill in the 2nd quarter of 2002.  
Some firms offer a press release warning of the impending 
impairment; others stay silent until revealing the impairment with the 
quarterly earnings release.  Prior research on warnings of earnings declines 
provides conflicting results as to whether the warning mitigates the stock 
price effect.  Firms have an incentive to warn of bad news to mitigate legal 
and reputation costs.  Also, prior research finds that market reactions are 
stronger during the earnings announcement period, giving firms an incentive 
to release bad news outside of the earnings announcement.  However, other 
research shows that firms that warn of bad news receive a larger decline in 
stock price than those that do not warn (Kasznik and Lev, 1995).  These 
findings may be due to the broad nature of items that can cause earnings 
declines.  My sample of goodwill impairments provides a homogeneous 
charge to earnings to examine if warning of the impairment helps minimize 
the stock price decline.  Therefore, I plan to compare the disclosure choices 
to determine whether it is better, in terms of the market reaction to the total 
news, to warn of impending impairments or to stay silent until the entire 
earnings information is released.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section 
contains a discussion of the previous research on goodwill and impairments, 
as well as the development of my hypotheses pertaining to the impairment 
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and amortization announcements.  Section 3 also contains a literature review 
regarding disclosure strategy and my hypothesis regarding the effects of 
warning of the impairment.  Section 4 contains a discussion of my data and 
sample criteria.  The analysis and results are discussed in Section 5, and 
Section 6 is the summary.
2. INFORMATION CONTENT OF AMORTIZATION AND 
IMPAIRMENT OF GOODWILL
2.1 GOODWILL AMORTIZATION AND MARKET VALUES
2.1.1 Previous Research
While numerous research papers examine goodwill created during the 
year of the merger, relatively little empirical research investigates the role of 
goodwill and goodwill amortization in explaining prices or returns. 
Jennings et al. (1996) relate goodwill and other components of net 
assets to the market value of equity.  They find higher multiples on goodwill 
than on tangible assets.  In a separate regression of market value of equity on 
earnings components, including the amortization of goodwill, they find 
weaker results suggesting that goodwill amortization is negatively related to 
market values.   They interpret their results as supporting the hypothesis that 
the amortization period is too short or that the market views goodwill as a 
non-decaying asset.  These results support the FASB’s new position on 
accounting for goodwill.  
Moehrle, Reynolds-Moehrle and Wallace (MRW, 2001) examine the 
ability of cash flows from operations, earnings from continuing operations 
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and earnings from continuing operations before goodwill amortization to 
explain returns.  Regressing 12-month market adjusted returns on each 
performance measure and a one-period lag of the performance measure, the 
authors find that both earnings measures significantly outperform cash flows 
from operations.  However, they find no difference between the two earnings 
numbers, suggesting that goodwill amortization has no additional explanatory 
power for annual returns.
Similar to MRW, Jennings et al. (2001) use a sample from 1993-1998 
to determine the usefulness of goodwill amortization to explain security 
prices.  They run two separate regressions of price on the earnings per share 
with and without goodwill amortization.  They find the R-squared is higher 
for the model using earnings without goodwill amortization as the 
independent variable.  They then run a model with earnings per share before 
goodwill and the goodwill amortization component as independent variables 
to look for incremental information in the amortization expense.  If the 
amortization expense is value relevant, one would expect a negative 
coefficient on the variable.  Instead they find the amortization expense has a 
positive but insignificant coefficient, and conclude that goodwill amortization 
is not useful in determining prices.  This result appears to contradict the 
income statement tests in Jennings et al. (1996) where amortization expense 
was negatively related to market values.
Henning et al. (2000) look at goodwill during the year of acquisition.  
In their second test, they regress 12-month returns during the year of 
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acquisition on earnings and components of goodwill amortization relating to 
different aspects of the goodwill asset.  They find a large negative relation 
between returns in the year of acquisition and the part of the amortization 
most closely related to the amount of goodwill attributable to overpayment.  
In sensitivity tests using returns in future years, they find no relation between 
returns and amortization expense.  Their results lead to the conclusion that 
investors discount the overpayment portion of goodwill in the year of the 
acquisition, but appear to view the other components of goodwill as fairly 
permanent, non-depreciating assets.  
Hopkins, Houston and Peters (2000), use an experimental settingf to 
examine how accounting method differences in business combinations 
impact analysts’ valuation judgments.  They find analysts’ made higher 
valuation judgments for firms using pooling-of-interests accounting than 
those using purchase accounting and amortizing goodwill.  They also find the 
timing of the combination affects the valuation.  Firms whose combination 
occurred 3 periods prior received lower valuations than those whose 
combination occurred in the previous period.  While actual value and cash 
flows are not affected by the accounting choice, the financial reporting 
appears to make a difference in the analysts’ judgments.   An important part 
of their predictions is the salience of the goodwill amortization in the 
presentation of the financial statements effects the valuation judgments.  
When the business combination occurred 3 periods ago, the goodwill 
amortization became less salient and the analysts did not adjust the earnings 
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numbers.  In their final hypothesis the authors present an income statement 
with goodwill charges net of taxes after the income taxes line item.  By doing 
this, the information about goodwill amortization became more salient and 
analysts’ valuation judgments were higher than when the goodwill 
amortization was included in the main portion of the income statement.  Their 
results suggest that goodwill amortization may still affect firm value in 
periods after the first year due to how the information is presented.
Finally, Choi, Kwon and Lobo (2000), examine the differential ability 
of tangible and intangible assets to explain market values, as well as studying 
the differential ability of depreciation and amortization expenses to explain 
current returns.  In their study, they find that intangible and tangible assets 
are priced similarly despite the difficult nature in assessing the values of 
intangibles.  This result supports the idea that goodwill is valued as an asset 
and is not simply overpricing in business combinations.  If goodwill is not an 
asset then testing the value relevance of amortization or impairments of 
goodwill would be completely uninteresting.  In their income statement tests, 
they find that depreciation is negatively related to returns, but amortization 
expenses are insignificant.  These results support the FASB’s determination 
that some intangibles, such as goodwill, are non-wasting assets which should 
not be amortized.
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2.1.2 Hypothesis of Goodwill Amortization and Market Values
So when is goodwill amortization value relevant?  We have some 
research suggesting that amortization expense is value relevant shortly after 
an acquisition has occurred, while other research suggests that amortization 
may become more value relevant after it has appeared several periods.  
However, the majority of research supports the idea that the market views 
goodwill, or at least a portion of goodwill, as an asset with an indefinite life 
making goodwill amortization value irrelevant.  These results may be driven 
by the market’s view of goodwill as a non-decaying asset or by the lack of 
value relevant information pertaining to the amortization expense.  
During 2001, many firms issued press statements announcing 
expected increases in future earnings due to the change in accounting for 
goodwill.  (See, Figure 1 for a timeline of disclosures)  This disclosure of the 
increase in earnings from the cessation of amortizing goodwill offers an 
opportunity to settle some of the conflicts in the prior literature regarding the 
market pricing of the amortization expense.  However, if the initial 
implementation of SFAS No. 142 results in an impairment charge, earnings 
could be much lower in the year of adoption than if the company continued to 
amortize.  Some firms warn investors of this possible impairment of 
goodwill. For instance, Armstrong offered the following disclosure 
concerning the implementation of SFAS No. 142:
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Armstrong adopted the new goodwill accounting standard, FAS 142, effective January 1, 2002.  Under 
this standard, goodwill is no longer amortized; in the first quarter of 2001, goodwill amortization was 
$5.7 million.  The Company recorded restructuring costs in several of its businesses totaling $0.5 
million and $5.4 million in the first quarters of 2002 and 2001, respectively.
It is likely there will be a non-cash impairment charge representing the cumulative effect of 
adopting FAS 142.  While the amount has not been determined, the non-cash charge is expected to be 
in excess of $500 million.  (Armstrong Holdings, Inc., April 30, 2002, PR Newswire)
Other firms stated that they expected that the goodwill impairment 
testing would not have a material effect on future earnings or that they did 
not expect an impairment to occur.  For example, International Flavors & 
Fragrances and AZZ offered the following disclosures:
Expected 2002 earnings reflect the elimination of approximately $ .35 per share of 
amortization of goodwill in accordance with Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 
No. 142, Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets, which the Company adopted effective 
January 1, 2002. This Standard eliminates the amortization of goodwill and other indefinite 
life intangibles, and requires an evaluation of goodwill impairment on adoption, and annually 
thereafter. The Company is assessing the impact of adopting the impairment provisions of 
this Standard, but does not believe it has a material impairment of goodwill on adoption.
Under this Standard, for comparative purposes, 2001 full year earnings excluding 
nonrecurring charges would have approximated $ 1.75 per share.   (International Flavors & 
Fragrances, Inc., April 25, 2002, PR Newswire)
The Company plans to adopt FAS 142, Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets, on March 1,
2002. Starting in FY 2003, the Company will no longer amortize goodwill. Amortization of 
goodwill will be approximately $1.2 million in FY 2002. The impact on the Company of the 
adoption of FAS 142 is currently under review. The Company does not believe at this time 
that the adoption of FAS 142 will reflect any goodwill impairment.   (AZZ Inc., December 
19, 2001, PR Newswire)
Will investors react positively to the earnings increase?  Will they 
ignore the impact of the amortization savings?  One could predict a positive 
reaction to the amortization savings in some scenarios.    If investors are 
functionally fixated on earnings and fail to consider the full impact of SFAS 
No. 142, then stock prices should increase upon the announcement of an 
increase in earnings from reducing amortization.  However, functional 
fixation could also predict a zero or negative return for the subsample of 
companies that include a warning of future goodwill impairments.
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If investors are sophisticated rather than functionally fixated, they 
may not react to the amortization savings.  If they view goodwill as a non-
decaying asset, then they likely ignored past amounts of amortization expense 
in forming their earnings expectations.  Therefore, ceasing amortization of 
goodwill will not affect their expectations of future earnings or their 
valuation of the firm.  A small positive reaction is possible if the cessation of 
goodwill amortization is expected to loosen debt covenants, although such a 
reaction should occur at the passage of SFAS No. 142 rather than specific 
company press releases.  A negative reaction is possible for the subsample 
that warns of future goodwill impairments if investors are sophisticated but 
did not fully anticipate the impending impairments.
To establish a baseline for future tests and to reconcile my paper with 
prior research about goodwill amortization, my first research question is 
stated formally as:
HB:  Does the market react to an announcement of an earnings 
      increase due to the cessation of goodwill amortization?
To test this question, I will use the following model:
CARt = α + β1Amtt+1 + β2IWarn t+1 + β3Amtt+1*IWarn t+1 + β4UEt + ε    (1)
CAR:  Cumulative abnormal returns for (-2,2) days around the announcement
Amt: Quarterly amortization expense savings from the announcement, per share
IWarn:  1 if announcement warns of future impairment, 0 if no warning of impairment
UE:  Forecast error, calculated as the IBES actual eps less the latest IBES eps consensus 
forecast
Amt is the expected savings from the cessation of amortization in 
future quarters.  IWarn is a control variable for firms which also release 
warnings of expected future impairments when adopting the new standard.  
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Both of these variables capture expectations of future periods and hence have 
a subscript of (t+1).  UE is the current period (t) forecast error, measured as 
the IBES actual eps minus the latest consensus forecast.  UE is used in the 
model to control for other accounting information that may be disclosed at 
the press release date.  
I do not adjust UE  for amortization for two reasons.  First it is 
uncertain if analysts include goodwill amortization in their forecasts.  Gu and 
Chen (2004) find that First Call analysts exclude goodwill amortization and 
impairments over 70% of the time.  Second the IBES actual eps number 
should represent a pro forma earnings number of all the items the analysts 
attempt to forecast.  If the actual and forecast both include (exclude) the 
amortization, then the resulting UE measure will not contain amortization 
expense.  I also run the test using a different definition of UE (actual 
quarterly earnings – 4 quarters prior earnings).  Using this simple definition 
of UE helps maintain the power of the test by allowing me to use firms not in 
the IBES database.
If the market reacts to the earnings increase of the no warning group 
then β1 will be positive; however, β1 will be zero if the amortization savings 
are value irrelevant.  If the market understands the implications of the 
impairment warning and the impairment warning is value relevant, then β2 
will be negative.  The interaction coefficient, β3, helps determine if the 
impairment warning affects the market’s perception of the amortization 
savings.  One possibility is that the amortization savings are value relevant, 
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but for the warning group, the announcement of a probable impairment 
offsets these savings.  If the market sees both the impairment charge and 
amortization expense as value relevant, then β1 will be positive and β2 will be 
negative.  If the warning totally negates the value relevance of the 
amortization savings, (β1+ β3) will not be statistically different from zero.
Testing whether β1 and (β1+ β3) differ from zero is important even though I 
expect a failure to reject.  These tests provide a basis for future tests in this 
paper.  The reaction to the amortization savings could potentially be positive, 
due to functional fixation or other causes.  If β1 and (β1+ β3) are not 
statistically different from zero, then my results are consistent with past 
literature and provide an interesting comparison of the market reactions to
impairments versus amortization.  
Another piece of information that may be effected by the cessation of 
amortization is analyst forecasts.  If analysts use goodwill amortization in 
their forecasted eps numbers, then the adoption of SFAS No. 142 should 
cause them to revise their forecasts of future earnings.  However, the firm 
specific announcements of amortization savings may cause analysts to revise 
their forecasts if they did not realize the impact SFAS No. 142 would have on 
the firm’s earnings until this date.  Liu and Thomas (2000) find that revisions 
of future earnings are correlated with contemporaneous returns.  This leads 
me to add Revise as an additional control variable to model (1).  Revise is 
defined as the revision in the IBES consensus forecast of earnings in quarter 
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t+1 from the period just before the announcement to the period immediately 
following.  This leads me to the following two models:
CARt = α + β1Amtt+1 + β2IWarn t+1 + β3Amtt+1*IWarn t+1 + β4UEt
+ β5Reviset+1 + ε (2)
Reviset+1 = α + β1Amtt+1 + ε (3)
CAR:  Cumulative abnormal returns for (-2,2) days around the announcement
Amt: Quarterly amortization expense savings from the announcement, per share
IWarn:  1 if announcement warns of future impairment, 0 if no warning of impairment
UE:  Forecast error, calculated as the IBES actual eps less the latest IBES eps consensus 
     forecast
Revise:   IBES consensus forecast revision of next quarter’s eps from the last consensus 
forecast prior to the announcement to the first consensus forecast following the 
announcement. 
Model (2) uses Revise as a control for the market reaction to the 
amortization savings announcement.  Model (3) examines the direct impact 
of the amortization savings announcement on the analysts’ forecast revisions.  
If analysts understand the implications of SFAS No. 142 or they have 
excluded goodwill amortization from their forecasts, then the announcement 
of cessation of goodwill amortization should have no impact on the analysts’ 
earnings forecast revisions.    
2.2 GOODWILL IMPAIRMENTS AND MARKET VALUES
2.2.1 Previous Research
Most recently, Hirschey and Richardson (2002) examine market
reactions to goodwill write-offs from 1992-1996.  Using a sample of 80 firms 
from this period, they find that goodwill write-off announcements have an 
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average 2-day CAR of -2 to -3%.  They also find market-adjusted returns of 
about -40% during the year prior to the announcement as well as -11% 
market-adjusted returns during the year after the announcement.  These 
results suggest that the market views impairments and write-offs of goodwill 
as being fundamentally different from amortization. 
Barth and Clinch (1998) look at Australian firms and the relation 
between prices and revaluations.  Although they had insufficient numbers of 
revaluations to analyze goodwill separately, they find a positive association 
between the revaluation of intangibles and prices.  In a secondary test 
examining downward revaluations, they find that while tangible asset 
revaluations are significantly associated with future performance, downward 
revaluations of intangible assets are negatively signed but statistically 
insignificant.  One limitation of this test is the inability to gather a large 
sample of downward revaluations of intangibles from their Australian 
sample.  Overall, they conclude that revaluations of both tangible and 
intangible assets are valued in the market.
One challenge for the market studies on impairments is the apparent 
ability of the market to anticipate impairments.  Alciatore, Easton and Spear 
(AES, 2000) look at impairments in oil and gas firms and find that the 
correlation between the impairment charge and contemporaneous returns is 
statistically significant.  However, it is smaller than the correlation of the 
impairment with lagged returns, suggesting the market has anticipated at least 
part of the impairment prior to recognition by the firm.  
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2.2.2 Hypothesis of Goodwill Impairments and Market Values
So do goodwill impairments affect market values?  Overall, the 
research appears to support the idea that goodwill impairments are associated 
with decreases in stock price, although the market appears to anticipate the 
impairment.  However, goodwill impairments surrounding SFAS No. 142 are 
unique in that the new standard is a mandatory change from amortization to 
impairment testing (see Appendix).  SFAS No. 142 requires all firms to 
perform an impairment test on existing goodwill.  Previous standards 
covering impairments were not as rigid in the timing of impairment tests.  For 
instance, SFAS No. 121 does not require firms to perform impairment tests 
until economic factors lead the firm to believe impairment may have 
occurred.  The mandatory testing required by SFAS No. 142 may reduce the 
likelihood that the market anticipates the impairment, but it may also change 
the value relevance of the impairment charges.  Under SFAS No. 142, a large 
number of firms are reporting impairments in a very short time frame rather 
than spread out over time.  Given these circumstances, it is unclear how the 
market will respond to impairments under SFAS No. 142.
My main hypotheses are as follows
H1:  The announcement of the impairment of goodwill is associated  
       with a negative market reaction.
H2:  The size of the reaction is positively related to the size of 
        impairment charge 
Despite prior evidence that goodwill amortization is not priced, 
previous studies show that goodwill is valued as an asset.  Prior research on 
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assets other than goodwill shows that impairment expenses are fundamentally 
different from amortization expenses.  Amortization starts with the basic 
assumption that the underlying asset is decaying in value, and accountants 
then try to estimate the rate of decay using an amortization schedule.  If 
investors view goodwill as non-decaying, then ignoring amortization 
expenses is a rational action.  However, investors who view goodwill as non-
decaying would rationally respond to the impairment expense.  The 
impairment expense is only taken if a material decline in the asset value is 
detected.  Therefore, the impairment expense is a signal that the underlying 
value of the asset has declined.  Impairments do not have a cash flow or tax 
benefit in the current period, so firms do not have a cash flow incentive for 
recording or measuring the impairment. 
To test H1 and H2, I will use the following three models:
CARt = α + ε (4)
CARt = α + β1IMPt + ε             (5)
CARt = α + β1IMPt + β2UEt + ε (6)
CAR:  Market adjusted daily returns for the 5 days surrounding the announcement 
of the impairment
IMP:  amount of the impairment divided by the number of shares outstanding
UE:  Forecast error, calculated as the IBES actual eps less the latest IBES eps 
consensus forecast
In all of the models, the independent variables are deflated by the 
price at the beginning of the returns period.  The returns variable is defined as 
the accumulated returns for the five days starting two days before the 
announcement of the impairment and ending two days after the 
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announcement adjusted for the cumulative market returns of the same period.  
The UE in model (6) is a control variable to capture the earnings shock 
coming out during the period which typically coincides with the 
announcement of the impairment.  I define UE as the actual earnings per 
share reported by IBES of the quarter of the announcement less the last IBES
consensus forecast of earnings prior to the announcement date.  I do not 
adjust the eps figures for the impairment of goodwill since it is unlikely that 
analysts attempt to forecast such charges.
IMP is the impairment loss announced in the press release on a per 
share basis.  I record IMP as a positive amount so that the relation between 
the loss and returns should be negative.  
In model (4) a significantly negative α coefficient would support my 
hypothesis. If the size of the impairment affects the size of the reaction, then 
in models (5) and (6), I predict β1 to be significantly negative.  Support for H1
does not immediately translate into support for H2.  The market could react 
negatively to the impairment news, but the market’s view of the size of the 
impairment could be different than the amount recognized by the firm.  
The β1 coefficient is likely to be small due to the transitory nature of 
the impairment.  If estimated well, the impairment charge should not contain 
information that persists into the future.  Therefore, market responses to the 
impairment component of earnings should be significantly lower than to the 
rest of the earnings data (Lipe 1986, and many others).  Additionally, the sign 
on β1 could be positive if the market anticipated the impairment to be larger, 
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or if the market sees impairments as a positive signal of management taking a 
necessary action toward “righting the ship.”  
Prior event studies have used both 3- and 5-day returns windows.  I 
use both in this paper.  Using a short window is preferred because it reduces 
the likelihood of omitted correlated variables biasing the coefficient on the 
variable of interest compared to using a long window return.  However, prior 
research indicates that accounting recognition of impairments is untimely, 
and the impairment is impounded into returns well before it is recognized in 
earnings.  As a result, using a short window for the tests will not necessarily 
capture the full effect of the impairment even if it is value relevant.  
Therefore, in all the models, I will also cumulate returns over a longer 
window to try to assess the anticipation of the impairment.    
3. IMPACT OF DISCLOSURE CHOICE
3.1 Disclosure Strategy Literature
The implementation of SFAS No. 142 also provides an opportunity to 
examine  differences between the firms that offered a negative announcement 
warning of the goodwill impairment versus those that stayed silent yet still 
recognized a goodwill impairment charge in their quarterly earnings.  Skinner 
(1994) proposes that firms have an incentive to warn of large negative 
earnings news prior to the earnings announcement.  This warning helps 
reduce legal liability and potential loss of a manager’s reputation.  Extending 
this idea, one would suspect that firms that offer positive or no news prior to 
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an impairment loss may suffer a larger negative price reaction than those that 
warn of the impairment.  
Contrary to Skinner (1994), Kasznik and Lev (1995) studied 
preemptive announcements of large unexpected earnings and found that firms 
that released an early warning of bad news had larger negative returns than 
those that did not release a warning.   They suggest that investors may 
overreact to bad news warnings.  This leads to managers weighing the cost of 
overreaction to the bad news warning with the potential legal and reputation 
costs of staying silent.  Kasznik and Lev also suggest that the larger negative 
reaction may be due to the persistence of the earnings news.  Managers 
choose to issue a warning when the bad news is more persistent; therefore, a 
larger negative reaction makes sense for the early warning firms.  
Libby and Tan (1999) studied this issue in an experiment.  Using 
analysts to forecast future earnings, they find that analysts issue lower future 
earnings forecasts when firms warn of bad earnings news than when they 
release all of the bad news at the earnings announcement.  Interestingly, in a 
debriefing question, the analysts stated that they viewed the bad news in the 
warning firms as less permanent than those that did not warn, however, their 
forecast values suggest they attached more permanence to the bad news in the 
warning group.   In a follow up study using similar methods, Tan, Libby and 
Hunton (2002) find that the lowest forecasts are for firms which issue bad 
news warnings that fall short of the total bad news in the earnings.  Their 
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results suggest that lower forecasts are associated with over-optimistic 
disclosures (i.e. understating the bad news).  
Soffer, Thiagarajan and Walther (2000) examine voluntary earnings 
preannouncements.  They suggest that investors pay more attention to 
earnings announcement news rather than preannouncements.  Under this 
condition, firms would always seek to manage expectations before the 
earnings announcement period, so that the earnings surprise is always 
positive.  To achieve this goal, they find that firms generally preannounce all 
of their negative news but only about half of the positive news and that 
market reactions are stronger for earnings announcement period than the 
preannouncement period.  
3.2 Disclosure Strategy Hypothesis
Given the results of past research my third hypothesis is formally 
stated as:
H3:  The market reacts more negatively to firms that warn of future   
        impairments.
To test how investors react to the impairment for different disclosure 
methods, I use the following model:
CARt = α + β1IMPt + β2IWARN + Β3IWARN* IMPt + β4UEt
+  β5IWARN* UEt + ε (7)
CAR:  Market adjusted daily returns for the 5 days surrounding the announcement of the 
impairment and the earnings announcement date
IMP:  amount of the impairment divided by the number of shares outstanding
IWARN:  dummy variable = 1 if firm gave wire release warning of the impairment due to 142
UE:  Forecast error, calculated as the IBES actual eps less the latest IBES eps consensus 
forecast
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The returns in this test are measured using two 5-day windows around the 
warning disclosure date as well as the earnings announcement date.  Firms 
that do not issue a warning of the impairment will not have a disclosure date 
window.  Instead, I use a dummy 5-day CAR and combine it with the 5-day 
CAR around the earnings announcement date for the non-warning firms.  The 
dummy 5-day CAR is measured around the median number of days that the 
warning firms issued a warning of the coming goodwill impairment.  β2
should be negative to support H3 that warning firms have a more negative 
CAR.  However, the direction could go either way, so I will use a two-tailed 
t-test.  If the results in Kasznik and Lev are due to overreaction, then the 
returns for the early warning group should be more negative (β2 < 0) than 
those who stayed silent.  If firms are penalized when holding back bad news, 
then β2 would be positive. If the impairments are anticipated from other 
sources or signals, then β3 will not differ from zero.  Using a longer return 
window in sensitivity tests may capture any market reactions that occur 
before in the 5-day windows.    
4. SAMPLE & DATA
In gathering the data, I began with a search of the PR Newswire and 
Business Wire on the LexisNexis database.  Using a search based on the 
words “impairment”, “goodwill”, and “142”, I found 3,183 press releases in 
the years 2001 through 2003 representing over 1,200 firms.  Expanding the 
search to include “amortization” or “impairment” with the previous search 
terms yielded 6,076 in the same time period.  The vast majority of these press 
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releases are quarterly earnings reports.  These numbers are significantly 
larger than the final data set due to multiple disclosures of the same event in 
later quarterly announcements. 
To collect firms not releasing information through the newswire 
services, I searched Compustat quarterly data for goodwill impairments (data 
items 249 – 252).  This search yields 471 additional firms which were not in 
the news wires dataset.  I have collected prior 8-k and 10-q reports for these 
companies and searched them for potential warnings of impairments.  After 
checking the 10q and 8k reports, 68 of these firm observations have prior 
warnings or disclosures of the impairments and have been coded as warning 
firms.
To remain in the sample for all the tests, I require the firms have daily 
returns data available in CRSP.  For later tests, I require that firms have 
financial data in Compustat and earnings forecast data in IBES.  I compiled a 
list of ticker symbols and company names from the news wires, in order to 
match these to the cusips in the IBES, Compustat and CRSP databases.  Firms 
which I could not match either the ticker symbol or the company name were 
deleted.  375 firms that are covered by Compustat and the newswires did not 
have returns data available in CRSP.  
In my impairment sample, 44 firms had stock price under $0.50, and 
these low prices could adversely affect my tests because I use price as a 
deflator.  Since deflating by a variable under $1.00 will actually inflate the 
variables, I decided to run the tests after deleting these observations.  Firms 
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trading at such low prices are generally not representative of the wider 
population of firms, lead to extreme returns from small price changes, and are 
likely to add noise to any tests.  After imposing these constraints, the data set 
of the impairment firms contains a total of 1,167 observations for 915 firms.  
Of these 915, 248 firms are classified as Warning firms for the disclosure 
tests.  Adding the IBES constraint the sample is reduced to 603 firms.  
The amortization sample has 555 firm observations, with 228 firms 
classified as warning firms.   The amortization savings are collected from the 
press release disclosures of the expected savings from adopting SFAS No. 
142.  AMT represents the savings for the next quarter.  When annual savings 
were disclosed, I divided the amount by 4 assuming that goodwill 
amortization is constant over the year.
Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics of the current sample.  
There are 915 firms with 1060 impairments.  The subsequent impairments 
occur in separate quarters and are not used in the impairment tests of H1 and 
H2.  In these tests I use only the first announcement of the impairment per 
firm not per impairment.  I use warnings announcements and earnings 
announcements of the subsequent impairments in the disclosure tests (H3).  
5. RESULTS & ANALYSIS
5.1 Amortization Hypothesis
Table 2, Panel A shows the results of the tests of Model (1) & (2).  As 
hypothesized there is no reaction to the earnings increase due to the cessation 
of goodwill amortization.  This result supports prior research that 
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amortization is not value relevant.  Another way of examining the value 
relevance of amortization disclosures is to examine the relationship between 
the announcement of the amortization savings and the revisions of earnings 
forecasts for the next quarter made by analysts.  Panel B, shows that forecast 
revisions made from the period before the announcement to the period after 
the announcement have no relation with the amortization savings.  Either 
analysts ignore the goodwill amortization, or they have removed the 
amortization from their forecasts at an earlier date, such as the enacting of 
SFAS No. 142 by the FASB.  These results support the assertion that 
goodwill amortization lacks value relevance, but cannot be seen as conclusive 
since the hypothesis supports the null and there are numerous reasons why a 
test may fail to reject the null.  It does, however, offer some evidence that my 
sample is similar to goodwill samples used in prior literature.
5.2 Impairment Hypotheses
Table 3 shows the results of the tests of H1 and H2.  To correct for 
heteroscedasticity, I use White’s adjusted standard errors when computing 
the t-statistics.  The sample for the test of Model (4) consists of the first 
warning or reporting of the first impairment per firm.  Using only firms with 
IBES data; the sample contains 603 observations.  As shown in Table 3, Panel 
A, the price reaction is negative during the announcement window 
surrounding the impairment news.  These results appear insensitive to the 
length of the returns window or the use of the equal or value weighted market 
index for computing the abnormal returns.  The negative intercept supports 
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my first hypothesis that there is a negative reaction to the announcement of 
the impairment of goodwill.  Examining the size of the reaction shows  a -
1.3% reaction in the 3-day window, which is smaller than the –2% to –3% 
reaction found by Hirschey and Richardson in their pre-142 goodwill 
impairment tests.  
To test H2, I estimate models (5) and (6).  To produce the 
impairment per share and earnings surprise numbers, I require the appropriate 
numbers be available in Compustat and IBES for that firm quarter.  This 
reduces my sample to 542 observations (one per firm).  Tests of model (5) 
(Table 3, Panel B), produce no support for H2.  In Panel C, adding the 
earnings surprise as a control variable, shows that the coefficients are all in 
the hypothesized direction, but β1 remains insignificant.  While H1 is 
supported, the lack of support for H2 may be due to a number of reasons.  The 
small sample size may lead to a lack of power to capture effects which do 
exist.  Another explanation may be that while the impairment does have 
information content, the market does not associate the accounting measure of 
the impairment with the underlying economic impairment.  This may be due 
to the nature of the goodwill tests suggested by the FASB, and the 
implementation choices of the firms in applying the standard.  
While I cannot address the measurement issue directly, I can examine 
the power explanation more fully by expanding my test to include more 
observations.  To address this issue, I run the tests using a naïve quarterly 
earnings surprise model, where UE = EPSt – EPSt-4.  This increases the 
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number of observations in the tests from 555 to 817.  Table 4, shows the 
results of the test of H2 using this definition of UE.  β1 is negative and 
significant in all tests, suggesting that the size of the impairment is negatively 
related to the returns.  
This result lends some credibility to the lack of support for H2 in the 
original model being a power issue, but other issues arise.  First, the nature of 
firms tracked by IBES may be vastly different from those not tracked.  
Second, using the naïve UE definition is possibly an inferior specification to 
the IBES forecast in capturing the true earnings expectations of the market, 
especially in a short-returns window setting.  To examine if the non-IBES
firms are the sole cause for the results in Table 4, I run the tests again using 
only non-IBES firms.  Table 5 shows the regressions of only non-IBES firms.  
This table shows no support for H2, suggesting that the non-IBES data is not 
driving the results in Table 4.
While power may be the issue, I also test for outliers driving the 
differences in results from Tables 3 and 4.  To address this issue, I winsorized 
the extreme 1% of each independent variable.  If extreme values in the 
independent variables, instead of power, are driving the results then applying 
this correction should show more harmony between the IBES sample in Table 
3 and the whole sample in Table 4.  Table 6 shows the results of the original 
sample with all the data after winsorizing extreme values.  Table 7 shows the 
winsorized results for the larger sample after relaxing the IBES constraint.  
The coefficient on IMP is now significant in the hypothesized direction for 
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all the model specifications supporting H2.  The intercept is only significant 
in Table 7 in the 5-day returns windows.    The results of Tables 6 and 7 both 
show strong support for H2 and the similar results between the two samples 
suggest that extreme observations in Tables 3 & 4 may have been driving the 
different results.
The short-window tests show some support for my hypotheses.  One 
may conclude that at least part of the impairment news is new or 
unanticipated information.  Table 8 shows the cumulative abnormal long-
window returns prior to the first announcement in my sample.  All of these 
long-window returns show significant and negative abnormal returns, which 
implies some or much of the impairment news may have been anticipated by 
the market.  Table 9 shows tests of H1 and H2 using 3- and 12-month return 
windows.  Both windows show support for H1, suggesting a longer 
anticipation of the impairment that just the announcement period.  While all 
of the coefficients are signed as hypothesized, only the 12-month window 
returns show a marginally significant relation of the returns with the size of 
the impairment.  This suggests that while the market anticipates the 
impairment well in advance of its recognition, it may not be able to 
accurately predict the actual size of the impairment.  It may also suggest, as 
in the original tests of H2, that the market’s view of the impairment is 
different from the accounting measurement.
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5.3 Disclosure Strategy 
Table 10, shows the results of the disclosure strategy tests.  In these 
tests, I include all available firms and impairment disclosures.  Panel A 
shows a simple model of the tests with just the indicator variable, Warn.  The 
results in Panel A suggest marginal support for H3, that firms that warn have 
a larger decline in stock prices over the warning and earnings announcement 
date than firms which release all the bad news at the announcement date.  
Panel B shows the full model.  The Warning indicator variable again shows a 
significant negative coefficient supporting H3.  These results support the 
findings in Kasznik and Lev that it is better to surprise the market with all the 
bad news at once than release two announcements of bad news consecutively.  
Looking at the differences between the Warn and NoWarn groups 
shows that over the 10-day window the Warn group shows a mean CAR of -
9.5%, while the NoWarn group experiences a decline of -6%.   This mean 
decline is fairly insensitive to the size of the impairment.  Increasing the 
impairment while holding UE constant reduces the overall negative return (β3
> 0) but only by a small margin.  Using the impairment per share at the 3rd
quartile, results in only a 0.1% increase in the CAR to 9.4%.  In the main test 
I compute the 10(6)-day return window for the Warn firms as the 
combination of the 5(3)-day window around the warning and the 5(3)-day 
window around the earnings announcement date.  Sample companies release 
their warnings a median of 85 days prior to the earnings announcement.  For 
the No Warn firms, I compute a 10(6)-day window using the 5(3)-day 
window around the earnings announcement date and combining it with a 
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5(3)-day window 85 days prior to the earnings announcement.  I run the same 
tests using a random window between 60 and 120 days prior to the earnings 
announcement date, and the results are similar.  
6. SUMMARY
With the implementation of SFAS No. 142, firms no longer 
amortize goodwill, but instead they subject goodwill to annual impairment 
tests.  The nature of the disclosures surrounding the implementation of SFAS 
No. 142 provides an opportunity for accounting researchers to examine the 
value relevance of goodwill amortization and goodwill impairments.  The 
news releases about SFAS No. 142 also offer an opportunity to examine how 
the market reacts to disclosure strategies managers’ use when releasing news 
of future earnings increases due to cessation of amortization as well as the 
future earnings decreases for goodwill impairments.  This paper contributes 
to the goodwill and impairment literature by examining the value relevance 
of goodwill impairments in setting prices.   This study also contributes to the 
disclosure strategy literature along the lines of Skinner (1994) and Kasznik 
and Lev (1995), by examining the potential differences in market reactions to 
firms who warn of impending impairments versus those who remain silent.
The results of this paper suggest, as in prior research, amortization 
of goodwill is not viewed as value relevant to the market.  However, goodwill 
impairments are value relevant.  These results support the FASB’s new 
position on accounting for goodwill as a non-decaying asset and suggest the 
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accounting for goodwill is more in line with the market.  However, even with 
the new standard mandating annual goodwill impairment tests, evidence 
suggests the returns lead the impairment news.  I believe further research 
could address the timing of goodwill recognition across firms and the 
methods employed to apply the impairment tests to determine the 
predictability of the impairments.  
Additionally, the disclosure tests suggest that firms that voluntarily 
warn of goodwill impairments prior to recording them in earnings have more 
negative returns than firms that release the goodwill impairment news at the 
earnings date.  A difference in returns of 3.5% in a 10-day window due solely 
to a voluntary disclosure shows a significant penalty to firms which choose to 
warn of goodwill impairments.  While this paper cannot measure losses in 
manager reputation or potential litigation costs which may offset the benefits 
of not disclosing the bad news, it does provide evidence that managers may 
minimize the negative stock price effects of bad news, at least transitory bad 
news, by withholding the information until the earnings are released.  One 
area of further research may be to examine other forms of earnings news to 
determine how the market views warnings in other contexts.
Academic researchers helped provide evidence for the FASB’s 
decision to eliminate amortization in issuing SFAS No. 142 (para. B10).  
Now its implementation provides a setting that allows research to uncover 
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Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics
Distribution of Impairments
Qtr N Impairments N
1 172 Initial 915
2 284
3 252 Subsequent 145
4 351
Total 1060 Total 1060
Variables Used in Tests
Amortization Set Impairment Set
Variable Mean(Median) Variable Mean(Median)
Amt_Undeflated 0.44 (0.02) IMP_Undeflated 1.83 (0.06)
UE_Undeflated -0.02 (0.01) UE_Undeflated -0.01 (0.01)
AMT 0.04 (0.00) IMP 0.41 (0.01)
UE -0.00 (0.00) UE -0.00 (0.00)
This table shows some descriptive statistics of the firms in the data set.  Each 
firm is represented only once, using the earliest date of impairment news.
The first set of variables are the undeflated variables while the second group 
represents the mean(median) of the deflated variables as entered into the 
regressions.
AMT = Quarterly amortization expense savings from the announcement, per 
share
IMP = Amount of the impairment divided by the number of shares 
outstanding
UE = Forecast error, calculated as the IBES actual eps less the latest IBES eps 
consensus forecast
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Table 2 – Market Reaction to Announcement of Future Amortization Savings 
Model:  CARt = α + β1AMTt+1 + β2IWARNt + β3AMTt+1*IWARNt + β4UEt  + εt






AMT*IWARN    0.1308 0.7174
UE 0.2860 0.0079
This table shows the test of the full sample which had all available data 
necessary to run each test using a 5-day return window.  Firm observations 
were lost due to lack of price, share, or earnings figures necessary to compute 
the independent variables.  Each independent variable is entered into the 
regression on a per share basis and deflated by price at the beginning of the 
returns period.  The amortization savings per share is a positive number. UE
is calculated as the IBES forecast error for the period on the announcement.  
Amortization Savings are projected savings for the next quarter.  Revise is 
the forecast revision for the next quarter between the consensus forecast prior 
to the announcement and the first consensus in the period following the 
announcement.  The variables in the regression are defined as follows:
CAR =  Cumulative abnormal returns for days (-2,2) around the announcement
AMT = Quarterly amortization expense savings from the announcement, per share
IWARN = 1 if announcement warns of future impairment, 0 if no warning of impairment
UE = Forecast error, calculated as the IBES actual eps less the latest IBES eps consensus 
forecast
Using value-weighted index to compute market adjusted returns yields 
similar results.  Using 3-day return windows yields similar results.
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Table 3 – Market Reaction to Impairment News 
Panel A: CARt = α + εt
Market Adjusted Returns N Estimate T-stat(P-
value)
3-day return equal weighted  603 -0.0131 -2.75(0.006)
5-day return equal weighted  603 -0.0191     -3.54(0.000)
3-day return value weighted  603 -0.0120     -2.56(0.011) 
5-day return value weighted  603 -0.0173 -3.23(0.001)
Panel B:   CARt = α + β1IMPt + εt
N = 542 Market Adjusted Returns
3-day 5-day
Variable Estimate P-value Estimate P-value
Intercept -0.0130 0.006 -0.0189 0.001
IMP -0.0000 0.728 -0.0001 0.323
Panel C: CARt = α + β1IMPt + β2UEt + εt
N = 542 Market Adjusted Returns
3-day 5-day
Variable Estimate P-value Estimate P-value
Intercept -0.0141 0.003 -0.01994 0.000
IMP -0.0000 0.735 -0.00009 0.326
UE 0.0573 0.020 0.05476 0.056
This table shows the test of the full sample which had all available data 
necessary to run each test.  Firm observations were lost due to lack of price, 
share, or earnings figures necessary to compute the independent variables.  
312 observations were lost due to incomplete IBES data.  Additionally, 23 
observations were lost due to prices being under $1 per share..  Each 
independent variable is entered into the regression on a per share basis and 
deflated by price at the beginning of the returns period.  The impairment per 
share is coded as a positive number so that the negative coefficient implies a 
negative relation of impairment size to returns. The variables in the 
regression are defined as follows:
CAR =  Market adjusted daily returns for the 5 days surrounding the announcement of the 
impairment
IMP =  Amount of the impairment divided by the number of shares outstanding
UE =  Forecast error, calculated as the IBES actual eps less the latest IBES eps consensus 
forecast
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Table 4– Market Reaction to Impairment News using a Larger Sample
Panel A:  CARt = α + β1IMPt + εt
N = 817 Market Adjusted Returns
3-day 5-day
Variable Estimate P-value Estimate P-value
Intercept -0.0060 0.1577 -0.0148 0.0022
IMP -0.0037 0.0001 -0.0040 0.0002
Panel B: CARt = α + β1IMPt + β2UEt + εt
N = 817 Market Adjusted Returns
3-day 5-day
Variable Estimate P-value Estimate P-value
Intercept -0.0038 0.3820 -0.0125 0.0121
IMP -0.0037 0.0001 -0.0041 0.0002
UE 0.0081 0.0477 0.0086 0.0602
This table shows the results of H2 using a larger sample and a Naïve model 
for UE instead requiring IBES data.  This adds 312 observations to the 
sample.  40 observations are lost due to lack of price, share, or earnings 
figures.  Each independent variable is entered into the regression on a per 
share basis and deflated by price at the beginning of the returns period.  The 
impairment per share is coded as a positive number so that the negative 
coefficient implies a negative relation of impairment size to returns.  UE is 
calculated as the change in quarterly earnings EPSt – EPSt-4. The variables in 
the regression are defined as follows:
CAR = Market adjusted daily returns for the 5 days surrounding the announcement of 
the impairment
IMP  = Amount of the impairment divided by the number of shares outstanding
UE    = Forecast error, calculated as the IBES actual eps less the latest IBES eps 
            consensus forecast
*** Using value-weighted index to compute market adjusted returns yields 
similar results.  
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Table 5 – Market Reaction to Impairment News - Non-IBES firms
Panel A: CARt = α + εt
Market Adjusted Returns N Estimate T-stat(P-value)
3-day return equal weighted  312 -0.0250 -3.84 (0.005)
5-day return equal weighted  312 -0.0417     -5.63 (0.000)
Panel B:   CARt = α + β1IMPt + εt
N = 272 Market Adjusted Returns
3-day 5-day
Variable Estimate P-value Estimate P-value
Intercept -0.0237 0.0003 -0.0403 0.0001
IMP  0.0000 0.9506 -0.0000 0.8514
Panel C: CARt = α + β1IMPt + β2UEt + εt
N = 272 Market Adjusted Returns
3-day 5-day
Variable Estimate P-value Estimate P-value
Intercept -0.0164 0.0127 -0.0358 0.0001
IMP -0.0000 0.7043 -0.0001 0.3610
UE 0.0107 0.0290 0.0080 0.1932
This table shows the test of the sample which had all available data necessary 
to run each test, but was not in the IBES  database. The purpose of this test is 
to see if the non-IBES firms are driving the results in Table 4.  Firm 
observations were lost due to lack of price, share, or earnings figures 
necessary to compute the independent variables.  Each independent variable 
is entered into the regression on a per share basis and deflated by price at the 
beginning of the returns period.  The impairment per share is coded as a 
positive number so that the negative coefficient implies a negative relation of 
impairment size to returns.  UE is calculated as the change in quarterly 
earnings EPSt – EPSt-4.
CAR =  Market adjusted daily returns for the 5 days surrounding the announcement of 
 the impairment
IMP  =  Amount of the impairment divided by the number of shares outstanding
UE    =  Forecast error, calculated as the IBES actual eps less the latest IBES eps 
             consensus forecast
*** Using value-weighted index to compute market adjusted returns yields similar results.  
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Table 6 – Market Reaction to Impairment News of Winsorized 
Sample
Panel A: CARt = α + εt
Market Adjusted Returns N Estimate T-stat(P-value)
3-day return equal weighted  603 -0.0102 -2.15 (0.032)
5-day return equal weighted  603 -0.0168 -3.18 (0.002)
3-day return value weighted  603 -0.0120     -2.56 (0.011)
5-day return value weighted  603 -0.0173 -3.23 (0.001)
Panel B:   CARt = α + β1IMPt + εt
N = 542 Market Adjusted Returns
3-day 5-day
Variable Estimate P-value Estimate P-value
Intercept -0.0048 0.3174 -0.0095 0.0793
IMP -0.0514 0.0322 -0.0666 0.0152
Panel C: CARt = α + β1IMPt + β2UEt + εt
N = 542 Market Adjusted Returns
3-day 5-day
Variable Estimate P-value Estimate P-value
Intercept -0.0045 0.3251 -0.0093 0.0813
IMP -0.0495 0.0418 -0.0653 0.0151
UE 0.1193 0.1757 0.0876 0.1563
This table shows the test of the full sample which had all available data 
necessary to run each test.  This table uses the same data as Table 3, except 
that the extreme 1% tails of each independent variable is Winsorized to 
address potential outliers.  Each independent variable is entered into the 
regression on a per share basis and deflated by price at the beginning of the 
returns period.  The impairment per share is coded as a positive number so 
that the negative coefficient implies a negative relation of impairment size to 
returns. The variables in the regression are defined as follows:
CAR = Market adjusted daily returns for the 5 days surrounding the announcement of the 
impairment
IMP = Amount of the impairment divided by the number of shares outstanding
UE =  Forecast error, calculated as the IBES actual eps less the latest IBES eps consensus 
forecast
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Table 7– Market Reaction to Impairment News of Winsorized 
Sample 
Panel A:  CARt = α + β1IMPt + εt
N = 817 Market Adjusted Returns
3-day 5-day
Variable Estimate P-value Estimate P-value
Intercept -0.0039 0.3811 -0.0128 0.0108
IMP -0.0157 0.0026 -0.0158 0.0076
Panel B:  CARt = α + β1IMPt + β2UEt + εt
N = 817 Market Adjusted Returns
3-day 5-day
Variable Estimate P-value Estimate P-value
Intercept -0.0041 0.3693 -0.0127 0.0133
IMP -0.0164 0.0072 -0.0156 0.0244
UE 0.0143 0.5418 0.0056 0.6437
This table shows the results of H2 using a larger sample and a Naïve model 
for UE instead requiring IBES data and Winsorizing the independent 
variables at the 1% tails to address the potential for outliers.  Each 
independent variable is entered into the regression on a per share basis and 
deflated by price at the beginning of the returns period.  The impairment per 
share is coded as a positive number so that the negative coefficient implies a 
negative relation of impairment size to returns.  UE is calculated as the 
change in quarterly earnings EPSt – EPSt-4. The variables in the regression 
are defined as follows:
CAR =  Market adjusted daily returns for the 5 days surrounding the announcement of 
 the impairment
IMP  =  Amount of the impairment divided by the number of shares outstanding
UE    =  Forecast error, calculated as the IBES actual eps less the latest IBES eps 
consensus forecast
*** Using value-weighted index to compute market adjusted returns yields similar results.  
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Table 8 – Anticipation of Impairment News
Market Adjusted Returns – Equal Weighted      
Window N Cumulative Return P-value
12-month prior 894 -19.86% <.001
6-month prior 896 -10.78% <.001
3-month prior 915 -7.15% <.001
2-month prior 915 -5.29% <.001
1-month prior 915 -1.93% .010
Market Adjusted Returns – Value Weighted      
Window N Cumulative Return P-value
12-month prior 892 -24.06% <.001
6-month prior 908 -12.93% <.001
3-month prior 911 -7.22% <.001
2-month prior 911 -4.17% <.001
1-month prior 910 -2.06% .006
Market Model Returns
Window N Cumulative Return P-value
12-month prior 793 -22.81% <.001
6-month prior 855 - 7.59% <.001
3-month prior 871 -6.89% .036
2-month prior 871 -2.65% .082
1-month prior 872 -2.26% .033
Size Portfolio Returns        
Window N Cumulative Return P-value
12-month prior 851 -20.78% <.001
6-month prior 865 -10.85% <.001
3-month prior 866 -6.50% <.001
2-month prior 866 -3.78% <.001
1-month prior 865 -1.91% .015
This table measures the extent to which the impairment announcement may be predicted by 
prior returns.  The windows are calculated back from the first announcement date of the 
impairment.   The return window is the month prior to the announcement (i.e. A June 2002 
announcement, the one month return would be calculated as the May return period, the 2 
month return would be April-May cumulative returns, etc.).  The abnormal return in the first 
panel is the cumulative return minus the cumulative return of the equally-weighted market 
portfolio for the same period.  The subsequent panels define the cumulative return using  a 
value-weighted portfolio, the market-model, and a market portfolio using size deciles.  
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Table 9 – Anticipation of Impairment News – Long-window Tests
Panel A: CARt = α + εt
Market Adjusted Returns   N Estimate T-stat(P-value)
3-month return equal weighted  525 -0.1126 -2.05 (0.041) 
12-month return equal weighted 525 -0.5008 -3.61 (0.000)
Panel B:   CARt = α + β1IMPt + εt
N = 525 Market Adjusted Returns
3-month 12-month
Variable Estimate P-value Estimate P-value
Intercept -0.1125 0.0412 -0.2939 0.0346
IMP -0.0003 0.6131 -0.0028 0.0624
Panel C: CARt = α + β1IMPt + β2UEt + εt
N = 525 Market Adjusted Returns
3-month 12-month
Variable Estimate P-value Estimate P-value
Intercept -0.0118 0.0355 -0.2809 0.0458
IMP -0.0003 0.6138 -0.0028 0.0663
UE -0.0440 0.5952 0.1290 0.5288
This table shows the test of the full sample which had all available data necessary to run each 
test using 3- and 12-month return windows.  Firm observations were lost due to lack of price, 
share, or earnings figures necessary to compute the independent variables.  Each independent 
variable is entered into the regression on a per share basis and deflated by price at the 
beginning of the returns period.  The impairment per share is coded as a positive number so 
that the negative coefficient implies a negative relation of impairment size to returns.  UE is 
calculated as the change in quarterly earnings EPSt – EPSt-4.
*** Using value-weighted index to compute market adjusted returns yields similar results.  
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Table 10– Tests of Total returns of Warning and No Warning 
Firms
Panel A: CARt = α + β1IWARNt + εt
N = 963 Market Adjusted Returns
3-day 5-day
Variable Estimate P-value Estimate P-value
Intercept -0.0470 0.0001 -0.0675 0.0001
IWARN -0.0192 0.0760 -0.0244 0.0483
Panel B:   CARt = α + β1IMPt + β2IWARN + Β3IWARN*IMPt + β4UEt + 
β5IWARN*UEt + εt
N = 702 Market Adjusted Returns
3-day 5-day
Variable Estimate P-value Estimate P-value
Intercept -0.0516 0.0005 -0.0608 0.0004
IMP -0.0000 0.7442 -0.0000 0.7776
IWARN -0.0249 0.0488 -0.0349 0.0156
IWARN*IMP 0.0003 0.1587 0.0004 0.0682
UE 0.0126 0.2396 0.0221 0.0638
IWARN*UE 0.2023 0.1251 0.1704 0.3269
This table shows the test of the sample which had all available data necessary to run each 
test. Firm observations were lost due to lack of price, share, or earnings figures necessary to 
compute the independent variables.  The returns variable is two 3- or 5-day CAR windows 
around the warning disclosure and the earnings release date.  In the No Warn firms a 3- or 5-
day dummy CAR is computed in a window around median (85) days prior to the 
announcement date.  This is the median length of the impairment warning for WARN firms.  
Using a random CAR in the 60 to 120 days prior to the announcement date yields similar 
results.  Each independent variable is entered into the regression on a per share basis and 
deflated by price at the beginning of the returns period.  The impairment per share is coded 
as a positive  number so that the negative coefficient implies a negative relation of 
impairment size to returns.  UE is calculated as the forecast error from the IBES actual eps 
minus the latest IBES consensus forecast.
*** Using value-weighted index to compute market adjusted returns yields similar results.  
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Figure 1-  Timeline of Events and Types of Possible Disclosures 
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6 Potential combinations exist in my sample.  The NI (No impairment) group is not part of 
my sample only the Impairment (I) firms.  There are four potential disclosure paths for 
Impairment firms:
I – (W or NW) – (D or GD)
An I firm can use either disclosure strategy of W or NW prior to releasing the impairment 
news.  This difference is the basis of the Disclosure strategy test in my proposal.  All of the I
firms are used in the impairment hypothesis tests.  
Additionally, the choice to warn or not warn of the impending goodwill is independent of the 
disclosure upon adopting SFAS No. 142.  Firms with goodwill were required to address the 
impact of the new standard in some way so no I firm can have no disclosure addressing the 
impact of adoption.  However, they may have disclosed only the amortization saving without 
mention of the impairment testing, or they could have issued the amortization savings and 
explained the new method of impairment testing as well.
AFirms were required to adopt for fiscal years after 12/15/2001, but could adopt as early a 
3/15/2001 fiscal year.  After adopting the statement, firms began to apply the transitional 
impairment tests to their existing goodwill.  These tests could result in the firm choosing to 
warn of a coming impairment charge.  The range of the warnings is considerable due to the 
fact that FASB gave firms up to six months after adopting SFAS No. 142 to complete the 
transitional impairment test.  
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Figure 2– Example of Amortization Disclosure
The following is an excerpt from AOL Time Warner’s 10-Q dated 8-14-
2001:
Accounting for Business Combinations
In July 2001, the FASB issued Statements of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 141, "Business Combinations" ("FAS 141") and No. 142, 
"Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets" ("FAS 142"). These standards 
change the accounting for business combinations by, among other things, 
prohibiting the prospective use of pooling-of-interests accounting and 
requiring companies to stop amortizing goodwill and certain intangible assets 
with an indefinite useful life created by business combinations accounted for 
using the purchase method of accounting. Instead, goodwill and intangible 
assets deemed to have an indefinite useful life will be subject to an annual 
review for impairment. The new standards generally will be effective for 
AOL Time Warner in the first quarter of 2002 and for purchase business 
combinations consummated after June 30, 2001. AOL Time Warner is in the 
process of quantifying the anticipated impact of adopting the provisions of 
FAS 142, which is expected to be significant.
Upon adoption, AOL Time Warner will stop amortizing goodwill, including
goodwill included in the carrying value of certain investments accounted for 
under the equity method of accounting. Based on the current levels of 
goodwill, this would reduce amortization expense and, with respect to equity 
investees, it would reduce other expense, net, by approximately $5.3 billion 
and $600 million, respectively. Because goodwill amortization is 
nondeductible for tax purposes, the impact of stopping goodwill amortization 
and the amortization of goodwill included in the carrying value of equity 
investees would be to increase AOL Time Warner's annual net income by 
approximately $5.9 billion. In addition, AOL Time Warner is in the process 
of evaluating certain intangible assets to determine whether they are deemed 
to have an indefinite useful life.  As a result of this process, AOL Time 
Warner may stop amortizing an additional $25 billion to $40 billion of 
intangible assets. This could result in an additional reduction of pretax 
amortization of approximately $1.0 billion to $1.5 billion, which will have a 
corresponding after-tax increase in AOL Time Warner's net income of $600 
million to $900 million.
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Appendix: Discussion of SFAS No. 142
SFAS No. 142 supercedes previous standards pertaining to the accounting for 
goodwill and other intangible assets.  Previous standards required intangible 
assets to be amortized for a period no longer than 40 years and were subject 
to periodic impairment tests.  In general, impairment tests were not 
performed unless the company had become aware of a possible impairment 
existing in their goodwill (usually through a sustained decline in stock price).   
SFAS No. 142 requires that firms no longer amortize goodwill or indefinite-
life intangibles, but instead subject them to annual impairment tests.  Firms 
must group goodwill and intangibles into reportable segments, regardless of 
the transaction which gave rise to the assets.  Each of these segments is 
annually valued and compared to reported book values to determine if an 
impairment may exist.  If the book value of the segment is greater than the 
market value, then the book value of goodwill is compared to the market 
value of the goodwill (present value of expected future cash flows) to 
determine the size of the impairment.  SFAS No. 142 also requires additional 
disclosures regarding the changes in values of goodwill across reportable 
segments, as well as estimates of future amortization charges for the next 5 
years.
SFAS No. 142 became effective as of June 1, 2001.  FASB required adoption 
of SFAS No. 142 for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2001.  Firms 
will fiscal years beginning after March 15, 2001 could choose to adopt the 
statement earlier.  In the initial transition from amortization to annual 
impairment testing, firms are required to complete a transitional impairment 
test, of goodwill existing prior to adoption, within 6 months of adopting 
SFAS No. 142.  Any impairment charge recorded in the transitional analysis 
is recorded as a Cumulative Effect of Accounting Change.  Impairments 
arising from the annual impairment tests are recorded in ordinary income.  
The Cumulative Effect of Accounting Change is applied to the 1st quarter 
earnings; however, the actual impairment may not be recorded until as late as 
the 3rd quarter of the fiscal year.  The news releases in my data set will 
correctly identify the period of the impairment being recorded, but the 
Compustat database records these charges retroactively in the first quarter
